This paper develops a decision-theoretic model of evidence production in the context of a discrimination trial. Producing evidence is assumed to be costly, and the cost can vary depending on what type of defendant behavior (and plainti¤ characteristics) the evidence bears upon. The goal of the trial is to uncover a possible behavioral bias in the defendant (intent to discriminate). We then ask how a "social planner" would structure the production of evidence in a trial in order to best achieve this objective, taking into account the cost of evidence production. We show that it is sometimes e¢ cient to sequence the production of di¤erent kinds of evidence (burden-shifting), or even to allow a decision based on limited evidence (e.g.., disparate impact alone, as a proxy for intent to discriminate). A key variable is the availability of evidence concerning the "productivity" of the plainti¤.
We study the choices of a benevolent social planner who sifts through costly evidence in order to make inference about the unobserved bias parameter. The social planner weighs the probativeness of di¤erent pieces of evidence against the cost of producing them. This trade-o¤ will sometimes lead the planner to optimally "economize"on evidence production. We will explore the hypothesis that the law is designed to mimick the choices of this social planner, and we will study the circumstances (parameter values in the model) in which it is optimal to economize on evidence.
Our analysis focuses on the probative value of di¤erent pieces of information. We focus on two di¤erent pieces of information: evidence about the defendant's behavior across di¤erent protected categories, and evidence about the heterogeneity in "productivity"across di¤erent categories of potential plainti¤s. When the social planner "economizes" on evidence, in our setting this means that he chooses to make a decision without information about productivity.
We connect the lessons from our model to actual evidentiary standards. We analogize choice based solely on the defendant's behavior, in the absence of information about productivities, to a standard of evidence based on disparate impact. Conversely, when the social planner optimally chooses to also acquire evidence about productivity, we interpret our model as calling for evidentiary standard based on disparate treatment (or intentional discrimination). Formally, of course, the disparate impact and disparate treatment are di¤erent causes of action, not di¤erent evidentiary standards. It seems reasonable, however, to operationalize them in a model as being di¤erent evidentiary standards. 2 Using this analogy, we explore the predictive power of our theoretical framework in explaining the variation in the behavior that is deemed illegal in various antidiscrimination statutes and laws.
Next we introduce the setup and discuss its virtues and limitations.
The setup
We have one defendant and N treated. The defendant is the agent suspected of discrimination. This agent applies a treatment to the treated. The treated are a pool of individuals who are a¤ected by the defendant in some way; for example, they might be the set of employees to whom a defendant (employer) pays a wage, or motorists who are subject to search by the police. Each defendant is identi…ed by an index i and a race R 2 fA; W g : Here race also stands in for any protected category, such as age, gender, etc. All the treated receive x iR 0 from the defendant (in the labor discrimination context, a wage, in the police case, a probability of searching the motorist). 2 Moreover, there is confusion in the law as to whether disparate impact protects employees from a conceptually distinct discriminatory injury than disparate treatment. See, for example, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has not resolved whether disparate impact is merely "an evidentiary tool used to identify genuine, intentional discrimination-to 'smoke out,' as it were, disparate treatment"); George Rutherglen, Employment Discrimination Law 72-73 (2001). There are N R individuals of race R among the treated. In what follows, we implicitly assume that either we are looking at the totality of the treated population, or that we observe a representative sample of size N of the treated population. 3 The defendant may also have selected the treated population in a prior phase (for example, a case of wage discrimination takes as given the employee population, which of course results from the employer hiring decisions). In this case the analysis is limited to bias in the current phase, and not with bias in the prior "selection"phase.
In addition to these players there is a social planner who represents the judicial system or the interests of society. The social planner must convict or acquit the defendant based on the available evidence and on a set of rules to interpret the evidence. This set of rules is speci…ed ex ante, before seeing the speci…c evidence for a given defendant. This set of rules is the ultimate object of our analysis.
Defendant' s behavior
The defendant chooses the vectors (x iR )
The term iR represents an objective "productivity" pertinent to agent (i; R) : What this productivity corresponds to in reality will be made clear in the examples that follow. The term iR represents a subjective bias term that a¤ects the defendant's objective function; a large iR is perceived behaviorally by the defendant as lowering the productivity of agent (i; R). The defendant knows iR ; iR when choosing x iR : 4 The negative squared term in this payo¤ function represents the cost to the defendant of action x iR (for example, the opportunity cost of moneys paid in wages).
Although very stylized, this model captures certain crucial elements in many discrimination settings. A few examples follow.
Example 1 Wage discrimination: Let x iR denote the wage rate and 2 ( iR iR ) the employee's perceived productivity (objective productivity minus bias factor). Suppose the employee chooses e¤ort e to maximize his salary net of the cost of e¤ort, max e x iR e e 2 2 so that the optimal e¤ort choice is e = x iR : Then the perceived revenue generated by the employee is given by e 2 ( iR iR ) = x iR 2 ( iR iR ) ; and the …rm's wage bill is e x iR = (x iR ) 2 : The …rm maximizes perceived revenue minus labor costs. Divide through by 2 to get the objective function (1).
Example 2 Hiring discrimination: x iR is the probability of hiring the applicant, iR the applicant's productivity. The square term in the objective function captures the opportunity cost of the resource x:
Example 3 Lending discrimination: x iR is the amount of money lent to the the applicant, iR the applicant's probability of repaying.
Example 4 Discrimination in police searches: x iR is the probability of searching the motorist, iR the motorist's likelihood of carrying illicit drugs.
Example 5 Selective prosecution: x iR is the probability that the prosecutor prosecutes the case, iR the likelihood that the case results in a conviction (a victory for the prosecution).
For each i; R the defendant solves
This is a concave function of x iR , and the …rst-order conditions are
These …rst-order conditions uniquely identify the maximum, provided the maximum is interior. To ensure interiority of x iR we will assume henceforth that iR > iR . This assumption guarantees that all treated receive a strictly positive x iR :
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The objective function (1) does not re ‡ect considerations pertaining to the possibility of being scrutinized, and possibly punished, for being found guilty of bias. In so doing we ignore the endogeneity of the discriminator's behavior to the social planner's policies (i.e., the rules used by the courts). This is an important "partial equilibrium" assumption which allows us to deal with the heart of our matter (rules for evidence production) without having to worry about the feedback of these rules on the discriminator's behavior. From a formal perspective, our analysis approximates an environment in which the probability of beign sued for discrimination is perceived as small by the discriminator. We believe that not much would change qualitatively in our analysis were we to incorporate this feedback e¤ect. 5 Without this assumption we have a censoring problem, which can be dealt with using speci…c statistical techniques. 6 That being said, we feel that endogeneizing the discriminator's response to the probability of being tried would be an important direction of future work. Equation (2) shows that the defendant's behavior towards the treated is the sum of two components: the treated's ability/productivity, and the defendant's bias towards the treated. Now we specify the process which, for each treated, generates a productivity and a bias.
Assumption 1 Each individual productivity iR is an independent realization from the random variable R : Each individual bias factor iR is an independent realization from random variable B R : We assume that R B R > 0:
This assumption says that the productivity of each individual in our sample varies, as does the bias factor which clouds the defendant's view of that particular individual. The assumption implies that, within race, bias and ability are not correlated. That is, the defendant is not systematically more biased against more (or less) able individuals. The last bit of the assumption ensures that iR > iR for all i; R: This assumption is needed to avoid the case x iR = 0:
Note that we are not making any functional form assumption on B R ; R : Note also that we allow A 6 = W ; that is, the distributions of productivity is allowed to di¤er across protected categories. This is an important feature of our analysis, since we want to allow for the possibility that what appears like discrimination is in fact merely a re ‡ection of an unequal distribution of abilities.
The social planner' s objective
The social planner represents the judicial system, or the interests of society as a whole, as pertains to detecting whether the defendant is biased. To make this objective formal we need to specify it mathematically. Let's start with some notational conventions. For a generic random variable X we denote its expected value by X and its variance by 2 X : We denote the di¤erence in bias across races as B = B A B W ; and the di¤erence in productivities across races as = A W . Now we specify what it means to be biased. We say that a defendant is biased if the probability distributions from which the treated-speci…c biases are drawn have di¤erent means.
This is of course a very speci…c formalization of what it means for a defendant to be biased against protected groups.
7 This de…nition says that a defendant is biased if he behaves toward the treated as if, in expectation, he discounts one group's productivity more. This formalization seems like a reasonable starting point for our analysis.
A notable feature of our formalization is that a defendant's biases against each individual member of race R are drawn independently from a probability distribution. This formulation makes it possible for a defendant to be biased against one member of race R and not biased against another member of the same race. Our model, of course, allows as a special case the one in which the bias is e¤ectively the same across all members of race R: This special case obtains when the variance of the random variable B R is very small (or even zero), which implies that the draws R will all be very close to each other.
We now place additional structure on the means of the two distribution.
Assumption 2 With prior probability we have B = K B ; and with complementary probabilty B = 0.
is the prior probability that the defendant is biased, that is, the subjective probability in the social planner's mind, before any evidence has been introduced, that for this defendant (B A ) 6 = (B W ) :This assumption places structure on the prior (subjective) probability that the social planner gives to the average relative bias. This assumption says that either the defendent is perfectly unbiased ( B = 0) or else he has a bias of a "size"equal to exactly K B : Clearly one could have been more general and allow for a richer set of possibilities. However, this simple formulation is su¢ cient to bring out the forces that govern our problem. One may wish to impose normatively that = 1=2; in order to capture an "unprejudiced"social planner.
The social planner needs to take an action, acquit or convict, not knowing for sure whether the defendant is in fact biased. The social planner's payo¤ from taking the action is given by the following expected loss function.
We take this expression to be the social objective in a discrimination trial. Here l CI and l AG are exogenously given positive parameters, which capture the loss from a mistake: convicting the unbiased (innocent), and acquitting the biased (guilty), respectively. The loss associated with making the correct decision is assumed to be zero. 8 One may wish to assume that the ratio l CI =l AG is very large, to capture the judicial system's concern for convicting of discrimination defendants who are, in fact, unbiased. Of course our formalization allows for this parameter con…guration, and for many others. Pr (CI) and Pr (AG) represent the probability of making these mistakes, and they depend on the the social planner's decision process. In our intepretation, these probabilities capture the standard of proof required to convict, what type of evidence is considered, the speci…c form of the doctrinal test applied, etc.). We will focus on these probabilities shortly.
The available evidence
We introduce some assumptions about what the social planner knows and what he can learn at a cost.
Assumption 3
The social planner knows but not B .
The assumption that is known means that there is no uncertainty in the mind of the social planner about the di¤erences across races in average productivity. But even though the expected value of the distribution is known, individual productivities in our sample are still randomly drawn, and thus unknown. They represent a powerful confounder in the social planner's inference problem if he is trying to recover bias from observing x alone (this is seen formally in equation 2).
Assumption 4 The social planner knows the variances of all random variables.
This assumption is merely technical and it simpli…es the exposition. If we did not know these variances, they would be proxied for by the empirical variances.
We now describe what information is available to the social planner. In our interpretation, this is the type of evidence that can be introduced in a discrimination trial. We do not yet address how this evidence is to be used to form the probabilities Pr (CI) and Pr (AG) :
Assumption 5 The social planner can learn
(average treatment for race R) at a cost C , and
(average productivity in race R) at a cost C :
We interpret learning
as producing evidence through discovery about the average treatment of treated in race R: We will interpret learning
as producing evidence through discovery about the average productivity of treated in race R: For example, in the context of wage discrimination x iR represents the wage earned by worker (i; R) and iR represents the productivity of that worker. In the context of racial pro…ling,
represents the fraction of motorists of race R who are searched among the N R stopped motorists, and
represents the fraction of stopped motorists who carry drugs. Note that we assume that the productivity of all the treated can be discovered, irrespective of their level of treatment x iR : This assumption greatly simpli…es our analysis.
9 9 An alternative assumption, which we do not entertain, would be that we do not observe
This statistic corresponds to the equilibrium "return" to the treated from treating race R; and is what is used in the so-called "outcome tests."(See Ayres 2002) . Of course, one may not need to worry about outcome tests in our context so long as x iR > 0; since in that case we can back out iR from knowledge
The costs C and C can be thought of as the social costs of producing evidence through discovery. In practice, these costs can vary signi…cantly across di¤erent contexts. For example, in the context of police searches, evidence on at least the x iR (probability of being searched) can be very easy to produce (low C ) if there is a record of all stops and searches; moderately di¢ cult (medium C ), if there is a record of searches but there is no clear data on the entire population for which we are trying to compute this probability; 10 or very di¢ cult (high C ) if no records of searches are kept. Beyond the direct costs of producing evidence, there are indirect costs. For example, a …rm may not want to disclose how much it pays its employees.
Assumption 5 implies that the social planner can exactly learn the x iR 's and iR 's. This is a stark simpli…cation of reality. In many practical cases it is not easy to know exactly how the defendant is being treated (the x iR 's). It is even harder to know the defendant's productivity withour error (the iR 's). For example, outcome measures (probability of …nding illicit drugs in a motor-vehicle search, or measures of productivity for an employee) are mere proxies for the iR 's. Still, even if we only have proxies for the x iR 's and iR 's, the analysis outlined below can be carried out using the proxies, and appropriately accounting for this fact when computing the variance of certain statistics. 
The social planner' s problem

Optimal standard of proof for given evidence type
In this section we ask what the optimal standard of proof should be, for given type of evidence available to the planner. The optimal standard of proof minimizes the loss function of equation (3). In practice, the optimal standard of proof will take the form of a cuto¤ applied to a statistic (a summary of the type of evidence available), such that the cuto¤ will identify a "conviction region" and an "acquittal region." This cuto¤, together with the of x iR and x iR iR : However, in many cases of practical relevance x iR = 0 is a frequent occurrence. For instance, in the case of racial pro…ling we may not observe the probability of treating x iR ; but rather only its realization b
x iR , which is either 1 (searched) or zero (not searched). Therefore, when b x iR = 0 observing b x iR iR is uninformative about iR : In words, the productivity (whether drugs are found) of a motorist who is not searched is usually unknown. In such cases, recovering the iR 's from observed outcomes (productivity of treatment) is much more challenging. In this paper we will not address this subject.
10 This is a problem because the population goes in the denominator in order to compute the probability of being searched. statistic to which it is applied,will determine the functional form of the terms P (CI) and P (AG) and thus the expected loss.
Optimal standard of proof under a disparate treatment test
In this section we characterize the functional form of the terms P (CI) and P (AG) ; in the case in which
(average treatment for race R) and
(average productivity in race R) are both observable. For given R; we choose to combine these quantities in the statistic
This statistic is not merely a disparate impact test because it incorporates more than just evidence about treatment (the x iR 's). Indeed, in this statistic evidence about treatment is "benchmarked"against evidence about productivity (the iR 's). Put di¤erently, this statistic is large when members of race R are treated worse than their productivity warrants. In fact, this statistic corresponds to a disparate treatment test in the sense that it is directly informative about a defendant's bias B R : Indeed, equation (2) allows us to rewrite
In words, under the model of defendant behavior which gives rise to equation (2) , T 1R is the sample mean of the iR 's which, recall, are realizations from the random variable B R : Therefore, this statistic is an estimator for B R : In fact, as the sample gets large T 1R converges in distribution to a normal with mean B R and variance
. This converges is written compactly as
Therefore not only is T 1R is informative about B R , but moreover we recover the (asymptotically Normal) distribution of T 1R despite making no assumption on the distribution B R :
This information can be put to use to obtain precise functional forms for Pr (CI) and Pr (AG) and, therefore, for the loss function. To this end, suppose that the planner uses the following threshold rule: convict i¤ T 1A T 1W > t 1 ; where t 1 is a threshold which later will be chosen optimally. Intuitively, we convict if the disparity between average abilities and average treatment is greater in the A population than in the W population. Then we can give a precise asymptotic expression for the loss function.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the planner uses a disparate treatment test, and thus convicts if and only if T 1A T 1W > t 1 : Then asymptotically the expected loss as a function of t 1 is given by
where y = . The optimum y , and therefore the optimal standard of proof t 1 ; is increasing in
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition gives an expression for the loss associated with any standard of proof that can be applied to a disparate treatment test. A large value of t 1 corresponds to a high (demanding) standard of proof required to convict the defendant. The optimal standard of proof trades o¤ two types of mistake: As y grows, the …rst addend in the loss function becomes smaller. This is because we are convicting less frequently, and so the risk of convicting the innocent becomes smaller. The second addend instead grows with y, because as we convict less frequently it is more likely that the guilty is acquitted. The optimal threshold, or standard of proof, is the one that optimally trades o¤ these two types of mistakes.
Optimal standard of proof under a disparate impact test
In this section we derive a functional form for the loss function under the assumption that the planner only sees the x iR but not the iR 's. In our interpretation this corresponds to a disparate impact test, because the planner ignores evidence about di¤erential productivities.
In this case the natural statistic to use is
Using (2) we have
This statistic corresponds to a disparate impact test in the sense that it measures how di¤erently two groups are treated on average, but it does not account for potential di¤erences in productivity between these groups.
The limiting distribution of T 0R should be compared with the limiting distribution of T 1R (see 4). Whereas the latter is purely a function of B R ; the distribution we want to make inference about, the distribution in (6) is "contaminated"by the presence of terms referring to R : Fortunately the term R is known by assumption, and so it can be factored out. However, the variance of T 0R is seen to be greater than the variance of T 1R : The di¤erence is due to the presence of the term
; which captures the "added noise" due to the fact that T 0R varies together with P i iR : Intuitively, looking at treatment only (the x iR 's) con ‡ates two elements: one that we care about, the possible bias; and a confounding factor that we do not care about, the unobserved variation in productivities, which we cannot eliminate.
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Following the same steps as in the previous section, we form the statistic T 0W T 0A : We will consider a procedure that convicts when this statistic exceeds a threshold t 0 : Intuitively, this is an event in which group W is on average overcompensated relative to group A: Proposition 2 Suppose that the planner convicts if and only if T 0W T 0A > t 0 : Then asymptotically the loss function is given by
where y = t 0 + s . The optimum y , and therefore the optimal standard of proof t 1 ; is increasing in
Best tests
In this section we consider the problem of a planner who is considering whether to acquire evidence about treatment or productivity or both. We ask what kind evidence the social planner would want to base his decision on. We interpret di¤erent kinds of evidence as corresponding to di¤erent doctrinal tests, or analyses, for establishing discrimination. We will consider two di¤erent kinds of tests: conditional and unconditional tests.
Unconditional tests
In this section we consider unconditional tests, which means that we do not allow tests such as: acquire information about treatment and, if after looking at that evidence it seems like there is cause for concern, then also acquire information about productivities. Examples of unconditional tests are those based on disparate impact, and those based on disparate treatment (intentional discrimination).
The …rst observation is that information on productivity alone is useless to the social planner in making inference about B . So we only need to consider three evidence con…gurations: f?g ; fx iR g ; and f iR ; x iR g : The …rst con…guration denotes the case in which the decision is based on no evidence, the second to the case in which the decision is based only on evidence on treatment (disparate impact standard), the third to the case in which the decision is based on a disparate treatment (intent to discriminate) standard. There …rst con…guration (no evidence) is not interesting, so from now on we focus on the case in which that evidence con…guration is never optimal. The exact conditions on primitives required to rule out this case are presented in Appendix B.
The value of evidence about productivities is given by its e¤ect on the expected loss that can be achieved using that evidence. di¤erence between the values of problems (8) and (7). Call this value V ( ); so
Proposition 3 Suppose the planner must choose between two unconditional tests: disparate impact, and disparate treatment. Then a. The disparate treatment test is optimal if and only if C V ( ) :
b. Which of the two tests is optimal does not depend on the heterogeneity in average productivity across protected categories ( ).
c. The higher the heterogeneity in productivity within protected categories ( ), the more likely it is that the planner chooses the disparate treatment test.
d. For any parameter con…guration there is always a C su¢ ciently large such that the disparate treatment test is not optimal, and a C su¢ ciently small that it is optimal.
Conditional test (McDonnel-Douglas)
A conditional test is a rule that calls for acquiring evidence on productivities iR only after observing certain realizations of treatment T 0W T 0A : An example is the "McDonnel-Douglas" burden shifting analysis, whereby …rst the treated is required to prove disparate impact, and only if this step is successful is the treated required (and allowed) to present evidence about productivities that might justify the disparity in treatment. We will further explore this analogy below.
De…nition 2 A sequential test is a triple of thresholds t 0 ; t 0 ; t S 1 such that: if T 0W T 0A < t 0 the defendant is acquitted. If T 0W T 0A > t 0 the defendant is convicted. If T 0W T 0A 2 t 0 ; t 0 then evidence on productivities iR is acquired, and then the defendant is convicted if and only if T 1A T 1W > t S 1 :
When will the sequential evidence veri…cation rule prescribe that evidence on productivities iR be acquired? Intuitively, when the value of additional information is higher. This happens for realizations of T 0W T 0A in their "middle range."The exact location of this middle range depends on the costs of type I and type II errors, among other parameters. When these two costs are of similar size, then the middle range lies around : When the realization of T 0W T 0A is extreme, either much above or much below , then there is a strong inference either that B = K B or that B = 0: In this case there is not much value in learning iR : In contrast, information about iR is most valuable when the realization of T 0W T 0A is middling, because in this case we cannot be sure about the value of B :
Notice that unconditional tests are a limit case of the sequential test. Indeed, the disparate impact test obtains when t 0 = t 0 ; and the disparate treatment test obtains when t 0 = 1; t 0 = +1: Therefore, the sequential test must always be at least weakly preferred by the social planner. In fact, the social planner's preference will frequently be strict. That is, the social planner will usually strictly prefer to proceed sequentially rather than unconditionally. The reason is twofold. First, suppose that among unconditional tests the planner prefers a disparate impact test to a disparate treatment test. This must be because the cost C is too high ex ante, that is, averaging over all possible realizations of T 0W T 0A ; the added information contained in the productivity is not worth the cost of acquiring that information. But even so, it can still be true that conditional on some realizations of T 0W T 0A ; namely those around ; the added information is worth the cost. In this case preference will be strict. Conversely, suppose that among unconditional tests the planner prefers a disparate treatment test. This must be because the cost C is low enough that, for most realizations of T 0W T 0A ; the added information contained in the productivity is well worth the cost of acquiring that information. But even so, no matter how small C ; for N R large enough there will be realizations of T 0W T 0A so extreme (very large or very small) that the relative likelihood of innocence and guilt conditional on those realizations is arbitrarily close to zero or 1. In these events it is very unlikely that additional information about productivities will change that ratio enough to change the decision. Therefore it is optimal for the planner to forgo this information. The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 4 Fix all parameters except C : There is a value C > V such that: for C < C the social planner strictly prefers the sequential test to any unconditional test; and for C > C the social planner strictly prefers the disparate impact test to any other test, conditional or sequential.
This proposition says that in this setting there is no role for a disparate treatment test in this setup.
The incentives of the parties to the trial
The analysis developed in the previous sections can account for two tests: a disparate impact test, which is optimal when the cost of acquiring information about productivities is high, and a conditional test which is optimal in all other circumstances. In this section we turn to a di¤erent setup, one in which there is no social planner who can choose when to initiate the (various phases of) the tests. Instead, there are two parties, plainti¤ and defendant, who strategically choose whether to go forward in a discrimination trial, given the doctrinal tests that the law imposes.
A reason why we might want to explore this more strategic setup is that the analysis developed above provides no role for a disparate treatment test: this test is dominated by the sequential (burden-shifting) test. But the disparate treatment test is very common in reality, and so we want to know whether the strategic formulation can explain its prevalence.
The new setup is as follows. First, the parties in a lawsuit have incentives that are not aligned with the social planner's. The plainti¤ and the defendant do not care about the probability of making the wrong decision, but rather about the probability of winning the lawsuit. Second, the plainti¤ typically does not fully internalize the cost of producing evidence (the process of discovery, for example, can be very expensive for the defendant). The social planner (the judge, or the judicial system) has two sets of instruments to govern the parties'actions: one is the type of evidence that he requires before making a decision. The second instrument is the standard of proof applied to the evidence.
First, we demonstrate that if plainti¤ and defendant can be persuaded to go through the various steps of the lawsuit, then a sequential test can be implemented by shifting the burden of proof, i.e., by a McDonnel Douglas type of analysis. To see this, consider the the …rst leg of MDD and set the standard of proof in the …rst leg at at t 0 : If T 0W T 0A < t 0 ; then this threshold is not met then the defendant is acquitted. If the threshold is met, then the defendant is allowed (but not required) to present as a defense evidence about productivities. The optimal standard of proof for this second leg of the test will be set at t S 1 : Thus we can replicate any sequential test, provided that the defendant opts to go through to the second leg of the test if and only if T 0W T 0A < t 0 : However, there is no guarantee that the defendant will follow this strategy. If the defendant is insu¢ ciently motivated to "…ght" the second leg of the MDD test, then it might not be possible to implement a sequential test in an environment with strategic parties simply by shifting the burden of proof. It might then be preferable to "force" the production of evidence on productivities, which can be done by settling for an intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) test. In this context the advantage of a disparate treatment test over a burden-shifting test is that the plainti¤ has the power to compel the defendant to produce evidence on productivities (through discovery).
Summary of predictions
Our analysis suggests that a disparate impact standard should prevail when the cost of acquiring information about productivities is large. When that cost is moderate or low for at least one party then we should expect either a MDD standard or a disparate treatment standard. We should expect the latter if the defendant has insu¢ cient motivation (relative to the social optimum) to …ght the charges, whereas the former should prevail when the defendant has an advantage in the production of evidence on productivities.
A di¤erent consideration, and a reason why the disparate treatment test might be dominated by the sequential test is that in the disparate treatment test the burden of proof of intentional discrimination rests with the plainti¤. In the sequential test (the MDD test), in contrast, the burden of proof rests with the defendant. Thus in the disparate treatment case the plainti¤ may need to expend considerable costs interpreting the evidence about productivity (perhaps provided by the plainti¤ through the discovery process). This is a social cost which may be avoided if the burden of proof falls on the defendant. Usually, the defendant will be able to interpret evidence about productivity more easily than the plainti¤, who might not be cognizant about the nuances of the production process. In our model, this wedge can be introduced by making the cost C actor-speci…c: we can then allow the defendant to have a lower cost than the plainti¤. Under this view, the advantage of the MDD test over the intentional discrimination test is that it places the burden of producing proof on the party that can produce the proof for cheaper.
6 Case law
Wage discrimination
Wage discrimination cases are regulated by a specialized body of case law which has crystallized in the so-called McDonnel-Douglas analysis. According to this analysis, the plainti¤ must …rst establish disparate impact, and then the burden shifts on the defendant to disprove intent to discriminate. It is reasonable to suppose in this case that the cost of acquiring evidence about productivity is lower for the defendant than for the plainti¤, given the employer's interest in monitoring productivity in the course of day-to-day operations. Moreover, in this case the defendant has considerable proprietary knowledge about the "production function," and so an outsider may …nd it di¢ cult to determine exactly how to measure individual productivity. In other words, the cost of producing evidence about productivity is lower for the defendant. Therefore our theory suggests that a sequential test with burden-shifting is appropriate for this case. This, of course, is exactly the MDD test.
This observation must be quali…ed by the fact that the standard of proof in the second leg of the MDD test is "business necessity," which is a very stringent standard. In practice, the application of this standard tends to de-emphasize the role of individual productivities as a valid defense for disparate impact. As a result, in many practical cases the MDD test becomes somewhat similar to a disparate impact test.
Selective enforcement
Selective enforcement and selective prosecution claims are regulated by the 14th amendment, and therefore they are formally subject to a disparate treatment test. However, according to our analysis selective enforcement should be divided into two categories. The …rst category is that in which few measures of productivity are generated during the enforcement process. One could think for example of enforcing fairness in the application of complex administrative regulations, where it is sometimes di¢ cult to measure whether the regulation has been applied in a color-blind way. In this case C is high, and so disparate impact may be the only possible test. The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, provides an interesting practical example. The U.S. Supreme Court argued that a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting the operation of laundries in wooden buildings had been applied selectively. On the basis of this ordinance a Chinese owner was forbidden from operating a laundry business in a wooden building, whereas eighty non-Chinese owners were allowed to operate laundries in wooden buildings. It is entirely possible that the eighty non-Chinese laundries were operated in safe (though wooden) buildings, while the Chinese laundry was operated out of a patently unsafe building. Yet, in the absence of clear measures of "safety"of an operation, intent to discriminate was inferred from egregious disparate impact.
A di¤erent case is that in which the enforcement activity naturally generates some measure of productivity. The prototypical example are claims of racial discrimination in tra¢ c stops. In the case of police searches, measures of productivity are potentially available even for the individual o¢ cer, through an outcome analysis. That is, it is possible to get a sense of the productivity of searching motorists of di¤erent races by looking at the frequency with which drugs are found on the motorist (success rate of searches). The exact analysis required to go from this statistic to a measure of intent to discriminate is subtle, and is developed in Knowles et al. 2001 . However, the main point is straightforward: in this case we have evidence, albeit indirect, about productivities. Therefore, in this case the cost C of acquiring evidence about productivity is not excessive, and in fact it is low provided that records are kept. Moreover, the defendant (police department) has no particular advantage in interpreting success rates, compared to the plainti¤. Therefore the cost of producing evidence about productivity is not much lower for the defendant. Therefore our theory suggests that a disparate treatment standard is appropriate for this case.
Of course, this hinges on there being statistics available about the productivity of searches. If the police departments do not keep such statistics then the cost C is very high, and in this case a disparate impact standard would be preferable.
Jury selection
The case of possible bias in peremptory challenges (voir dire) refers typically to the scenario where a prosecutor might preferentially strike minority jurors from a jury. Bias in voir dire is governed by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). That case establishes a sequential test analogous to the MDD test. According to that test, the defendant must …rst establish a case of disparate impact by showing that minority jurors have been struck disproportionately. If this …rst prong of the test is met, then the prosecutor can give his reasons for excluding such jurors. If the reasons dispel the assumption of intentional discrimination, then the prosecutor is allowed to strike the jurors. Of course, the mechanism by which a prosecutor decides to strike a juror is murky, and only the prosecutor himself can clarify the reasons. In other words, the prosecutor has considerable proprietary knowledge about the "production function," and so an outsider may …nd it di¢ cult to determine exactly how to measure individual productivity. Since the cost of producing evidence about productivity is lower for the prosecutor, our theory suggests that a sequential test with burden-shifting is appropriate for this case. This is, of course, exactly the Batson test.
Lending discrimination
Nominally, lending discrimination is subject to a sequential, MDD-type test (Walter 1995) . However, the federal agencies charged with enforcing fair lending have set a "business necessity" standard for the second leg of the test (Walter 1995, p. 67) . This is a more stringent standard than the "legitimate business reason" test. In practice, this demanding standard has the e¤ect of driving the enforcement of lending discrimination towards a disparate impact standard. However, the lending process automatically produces evidence about productivities (probability of repaying the loan), namely, the default rate. This evidence is available at very low cost (low C ). Moreover, a comparative analysis of default rates could be carried out by plainti¤s just as well as by defendants. Therefore, our theory would predict that lending discrimination should be regulated by a disparate treatment test, which of course it is not. In fact, to our knowledge di¤erentials in default rates are not considered a valid defense in the enforcement of lending discrimination.
Housing discrimination
The situation in the housing discrimination arena is very similar to that in lending discrimination. There is agreement that a MDD type test should be applied, but there is disagreement as to what standard should be applied to the second leg of the test, whether a "business necessity" or a "legitimate business reason standard." The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo favors a business necessity standard.
12 But the Tenth Circuit rejected the "compelling business necessity"in favor of a "legitimate, non-pretextual justi…cation."The Court stated that "the Secretary went beyond the business necessity test that the Supreme Court has enunciated in Title VII cases and incorrectly required that Mountain Side demonstrate a compelling need or necessity."
13 In most cases the defendant (developer, lender, etc.) probably has more information about intent to discriminate, and so a MDD-type burden-shifting test is predicted by our theory. But, as to how stringent a test should be applied in the second leg, the theory does not make sharp predictions. This is because housing discrimination cases are very heterogeneous with respect to ease of proving intent to discriminate. Proving intent may be more di¢ cult in some housing discrimination cases (sales of real estate, zoning laws) and easier in others (for example, in the case of mortgage lending it might be easy to see the pro…tability of loans, which can be used to infer bias). Given this heterogeneity, the ambiguity observed in the case law is perhaps a reasonable posture.
Conclusions
The practical impact of anti-discrimination law depends crucially on what tests are applied to identify unlawful discrimination. Two tests, disparate impact and disparate treatment, represent the polar extremes. The burden-shifting (McDonnel-Douglas) test is in between. The conventional wisdom focuses on the "distributive"consequences of these tests (the …rst 12 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977). The court stated that the defendant's burden in Title VIII cases was to show that the policy or practice being challenged must serve, in theory and practice, a legitimate, bona …de interest of the Title VIII defendant, and the defendant must show that no alternative course of action could be adopted that would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact. 13 The Tenth Circuit rejected the "compelling business necessity standard advocated by HUD for private defendants. The court held that "the defendants had overcome the prima facie case by evidence of legitimate, non-pretextual justi…cations. is more plainti¤-friendly than the second). In this paper we have taken a di¤erent approach: we have derived these tests as the solution to the problem of a social planner who is trying to maximize the accuracy of the verdict minus the costs of producing evidence. We have then looked at several important areas of application of discrimination law, and we have tried to justify the di¤erent standards applied in each area on the basis of the predictions of our theory. Broadly speaking the theory has some predictive power in explaining the variation in doctrinal standards. . Therefore the probability of convicting the innocent is
A Proofs
Similarly, the probability of acquitting the guilty is
Thus the loss function associated with t 1 is
where we have made the change of variables y = The derivative of the loss function with respect to y is
where represents the p.d.f. of the standard Normal distribution. This function can be written as
which shows that the derivative of the loss function has the same sign as the term in brackets. We want to show that the LHS of the term in brackets is increasing in y: It is increasing i¤ a monotone transformation is. Applying the log transformation yields
which is increasing in y: This shows that the LHS is increasing in y: It follows that the loss function is concave: Interiority of the optimum follows from a well-known property of the Normal distribution which is that the likelihood ratio
goes to in…nity as y ! 1 and to 1 when y ! 1: The interior optimum is the point y at which the term in brackets is zero; it follows that y is increasing in it follows that L 1 (y) < L 0 (y) for all y: Therefore min y L 1 (y) < min y L 0 (y) or, equivalently, L 1 (y 1 ) < L 0 (y 0 ) :
Next we show that V ( ) is bounded above. If the planner collects evidence about f iR ; x iR g then the planner su¤ers
The planner who is considering whether to incur the cost of verifying abilities solves min fL 0 (y 0 ) ; L 1 (y 1 ) + C g :
If this quantity is greater than L ? C B then it is optimal for the planner to collect no evidence. We make the assumption that collecting some evidence, i.e., having some sort of discovery is e¢ cient.
Assumption 6 min fL 0 (y 0 ) ; L 1 (y 1 ) + C g < L ? C B :
If this assumption is veri…ed, the only question that remains is whether it is optimal for the planner to collect evidence on fx iR g only, or on f iR ; x iR g :
